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Abstract
Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than con-
ventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern
extends to a field setting where (much like in a lab) we are able to
control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: cab drivers in Mexico
City. We find a remarkably high degree of trustworthiness, also with
price-haggling, which is predicted to reduce trustworthiness.
Keywords: trust, honesty, reciprocity, field experiment, haggling,
taxis
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1 Introduction
During the last quarter-century, economists argued that social preferences
shape behavior in important ways. Many laboratory experiments were con-
ducted with students who exhibit qualities researchers deem convenient (like
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being accessible, smart, and motivated by low stakes) in settings controlled to
rule out confounds of repeat-play or reputation. Over time, the lab evidence
has amassed and now paints a picture where trust, cooperation, and honesty
are abundant but not universal. It is legitimate to wonder about external
validity though, and desirable to perform parallel field tests. It may then be
a challenge to maintain control regarding repeat-play and reputation. We
attempt to overcome that hurdle by conducting an experiment in the highly
decentralized market for taxi rides in Mexico City (MC), where the chances
of repeated encounters are minuscule.1
Our primary concern is trustworthiness. We flag down cabs at point A,
ask them to deliver a CD to point B, paying in advance. From the viewpoint
of the driver, the situation is analogous to that of the second-mover (the
“trustee”) in a lab trust game, in particular versions that allow cheap talk
before play.2 In the lab, trustees cooperate with high but not full frequency.
We ask if that pattern translates to the streets of MC.3
We ran a pilot for thatBaseline treatment, planning to condition further
research questions and treatments on the nature of the data. If trustworthi-
ness were low, we would have a treatment adding handshakes & promises
to the pre-play communication with the driver to test if such enhanced
covenants boost trustworthiness. However, trustworthiness was extremely
high already in the Baseline, so we scrapped the promises & handshakes
treatment. Instead, we ran a Haggling treatment, predicted to instead re-
1According to Mexico’s “Secretaria de Transportes y Vialidad” in 2011, 102,110 licensed
taxis served almost 9 million people in Mexico City, and over 21 million in the larger
metropolitan area. The taxis drivers are self-proprietors holding individual licenses (as
opposed working for a taxi company) making it virtually impossible to track them down.
2See, e.g., Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) for a pioneering contribution and Charness
& Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008) for versions with pre-play communication.
3Our experiments were carried out in 2011, before the car-sharing cell-phone technology
enabled passengers to track the drivers. A few other recent studies of taxi markets have
also addressed questions of cooperation and cheating (Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer &
Sutter 2013; Balafoutas, Kerschbamer & Sutter 2017; Castillo, Petrie, Torero & Vesterlund
2013; Bengtsson 2016). In contrast to those studies, our design is geared to generate a
direct analog to a trust game in the field.
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duce trustworthiness: If a cab driver asked for a price p then we haggled and
tried to bring the price down to pr < p. Our hypothesis, which is intuitive
but also consistent with reciprocity theory, is that delivery rates will be lower
in Haggling than in Baseline.4
2 Theory
Assume that cab driver C perceives that he interacts with passenger P as
follows:
C has offered to deliver a CD for the price p. In response, P may reject
(and walk away) or accept or counter at the lower price pr < p. In the
latter two cases, C may choose whether to deliver or not, and in response
to counter, C may furthermore also reject (and walk away). We normalize
payoffs such that each player gets 0 if either player rejects and P ’s value of
a safe delivery equals 1. In addition, C faces transportation costs of t. To
allow meaningful gains-from-trade, assume that 1 > p > pr > t > 0.
If the players are selfish there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
C chooses not to deliver at each of his nodes and P rejects at the root. The
outcome is materially inefficient. That conclusion changes if C is sufficiently
4Reciprocity has been documented mostly in laboratory experiments (see, e.g., Fehr &
Gächter 2000 and Sobel 2005 for discussions).
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strongly motivated by kindness-based reciprocity, as modeled by Dufwenberg
& Kirchsteiger’s (2004) (D&K) notion of sequential reciprocity equilibrium
(SRE).5 To explain, we first describe C’s choices as a behavior strategy: Let
δ be the probability of deliver following accept. Let ε be th probability of
deliver following counter. Let ρ be the probability of reject following counter.
In D&K’s theory there is key parameter YCP ≥ 0 measuring the degree to
which C gets utility from reciprocation, with higher values meaning higher
sensitivity. The following result provides a behavioral foundation for our
experimental hypothesis about the effect of haggling:
Proposition 1 (i) In any SRE it holds that δ ≥ ε ≥ ρ = 0. (ii) There exist
h > ℓ > 0 such that if ℓ <YCP < h then in any SRE it holds that δ > ε.
We shall test the hypothesis that haggling leads to lower delivery rates,
and Proposition 1 shows that this is consistent with reciprocity theory (if
ℓ < YCP < h). The proof requires an introduction of D&K’s formalism;
we provide that in the Appendix. Here we just offer the following brief
interpretation: In SRE, C always perceives accept by P to be at least as
kind or kinder than counter, so C’s inclination to be kind in return is then
reflected in that δ ≥ ε. Moreover, if C is eager to reciprocate kindness, but
not too eager, delivery is strictly more likely following accept than counter.
3 Experimental design
We selected a six-mile route along Via Insurgentes, a straight and major
traffic artery in MC. A cab ride takes 20-30 minutes and costs about 30
pesos. We employed two research assistants (RA) who were native speakers.
The RA at point A (“RA-A”) flagged down a cab, and asked the driver to
deliver a CD containing a movie clip to his friend (“RA-B”) at point B. RA-
A asked for the price, explained that the friend at point B had no money,
and proposed to pay up front. The next move depended on the treatment.
5D&K extend to extensive games ideas about reciprocity pioneered by Rabin (1993).
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The cab drivers were assigned to treatments – Baseline or Haggling
– in an alternating fashion. In Baseline, RA-A agreed to the offered fare.
In Haggling, RA-A made a counteroffer, subtracting 10 pesos from the
driver’s proposal. If the driver made a counteroffer, RA-A agreed and paid
up. If the driver rejected the lower fare, then RA-A tried to get a discount by
making successive offers until the driver agreed. (There were no rejections.)
After a deal was struck, RA-A thanked the driver, described what the friend
looked like, and paid. As the cab drove off, RA-A discretely recorded the
data and sent an SMS to RA-B. Once the cab arrived at point B, RA-B
collected the CD and thanked the driver. If the driver demanded additional
money, RA-B pretended he did not know that the fare has already been paid,
paid the driver, and recorded the sum, the license plate, and the time.
4 Results
Seven cabs refused to be hired. Among the others, we count 31 observations
in Baseline and 30 in Haggling.6 For those, the initial price proposals
averaged 38.97 in Baseline7 and 40.00 in Haggling and were not signifi-
cantly different (p = 0.546; Mann-Whitney ranksum test). The final prices in
Haggling averaged 32.70 and were significantly lower than initial proposals
in either treatment (p < 0.001 for both comparisons). There is no statistical
difference in the amount of time it took the cabs to deliver the CD between
the two treatments (p = 0.359).8
Our two main findings are as follows:
6RA-A felt uncomfortable haggling with drivers who made very low initial offer (≤ 25
Pesos) and assigned such cabs to Baseline. He similarly assigned an unusually high
offer (≥ 60 Pesos) to Haggling. To eliminate possible selection bias at the tails of our
initial offer distributions we excluded those data points and conduct the analysis on the
remaining 61 observations. Including them does not change our main results.
7In Baseline, two cab drivers refused to make a proposal, instead asking RA-A for an
offer. RA-A guessed an average fare based on traffic conditions. In one case he offered 30,
in the other 50. Both offers were accepted (and the observation assigned to Baseline).
8The data is described in more detail by Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix.
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• Comparing our MC setting to all those lab experiments with students
(cited in the introduction), our measure of trustworthiness (delivery
rates) is much higher. With the exception of a single cab driver (in
Baseline), every cab driver who agreed to deliver the CD did so.
• The prediction that delivery rates would be lower following price Hag-
gling was not supported; see the previous bullet.9
Robustness We conducted a robustness check at a different location, along
the street Calle Bolivar between Avenida Hidalgo and Eje 6 Sur (see the
Appendix for a map). We only ran the Haggling treatment with 20 cabs.
All of them delivered.
Unexpected forms of cheating While there was virtually universal deliv-
ery, in twelve cases (seemingly not distinguishable by treatment), cab drivers
cheated in other ways. Their gimmicks included telling RA-B that RA-A
had not paid; showing up with a (possibly manipulated) meter read, vastly
exceeding the amount originally agreed to and asking for a matching top-up;
and claiming that some previously not mentioned extra fee applied.
What did MC locals expect? We didn’t in our wildest dreams predict
the astonishing level of honesty (as regards delivery rates) exhibited by our
MC cab drivers. On seeing the data, we got curious whether also MC locals
would find the results surprising. Therefore, we conducted a survey with
students at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). We used the
technique for eliciting shared opinions developed by Houser & Xiao (2011).
Many locals seem likeminded to us. We did not find any evidence of consensus
between them that all cabs would deliver. See the Appendix for details.
9We are not rejecting the predictions of Proposition 1, which shows that our hypothesis
of lower delivery rates in Haggling is consistent with reciprocity theory (if ℓ < YCP < h).
But Proposition 1 is also consistent with the actual data (if YCP > h).
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5 Concluding remark
While our results surprised us, in retrospect, and in light of another arti-
cle of ours perhaps we should have known better? Dufwenberg, Servátka &
Vadovič (2017) develop a theory of informal agreements in which one of two
central assumptions is that once a person enters an informal agreement he
or she will not renege.10 When we designed our experiment, we did not have
that theory in mind. We were rather thinking in terms of a comparison to lab
experiments with students, and whether we could by treatment marginally
affect trustworthiness in the directions described in the introduction. How-
ever, it appears that (i) our design generates informal agreements that the
CDs be delivered, and (ii) The 2017-theory would do a good job at explaining
the data, even though our current experiment was never intended to test it.
Appendix
A.1 Price-haggling and reciprocity
Elements of D&K We focus mainly on C’s utility which consists of a
material component (πC(·)) and a reciprocity component. The latter is the
product of how kind C believes that P is to him (λCPC(·)) and how kind C
is to P in return (κCP (·)), weighted by C’s reciprocity sensitivity parameter
YC ≥ 0. So C’s utility has the form πC(·) + YC × κCP (·)× λCPC(·).
In order to measure kindness, we need to consider the beliefs a player
holds about the strategy of the other. Ai is i’s set of behavioral strategies,
bij ∈ Ai is the first-order belief of i about j’s strategy, and ciji ∈ Ai is i’s
second-order belief of about j’s belief about i’s strategy.11 πj(ai, bij) is the
(material) payoff i believes he gives to j (computed as if aj = bij), and i
is kind to j if i believes he gives j a relatively high payoff. Formally, i’s
10The second assumption, less relevant for our purposes here, is that temptations to
reneg affect the form of the informal agreements that people strike. For some related
work, see also Miettinen (2013).
11All beliefs are point-beliefs, assigning probability 1 to whatever is believed.
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kindness is computed by comparing πj(ai, bij) to the average, or “equitable,”












where Ei⊂Ai contains those (“efficient”) strategies of i that do not for sure
lead to Pareto-inferior material outcomes in any history of play.12. In our
game ai ∈ Ai\Ei iff i = C and aC puts positive probability on the choice
reject following renegotiate.13
i’s kindness from choosing ai when holding belief bij, is defined as
κij (ai, bij) = πj(ai, bij)− π
e
j (bij)
and i’s belief about the kindness of j, λiji, is derived the same way as κji,
replacing j’s strategy aj by bij and by replacing bji by c:
λjij (bji, cjij) = πj(bji, cjij)− π
e
j (cjij).
In SRE, beliefs coincide with the chosen strategies and at every history
of play beliefs are updated to be consistent with reaching that history. Fur-
thermore, at all histories choices must be optimal given the beliefs.
Proof of Proposition 1: Recall that δ, ε, and ρ are the probabilities
of, respectively, deliver following accept, deliver following counter, and reject
following counter. We establish three lemmas around which the proof is then
built:
Lemma 1 : In any SRE, ρ = 0. To see this, note that if aC puts a positive
probability on reject following counter, then it is not an efficient strategy (as
defined earlier in this section). It can never be rationally used except as an
12Strategies in Ai\Ei are called “inefficient” because they involve Pareto-decreasing
“waste” after some history of play.Refer to D&K (pp. 275-7) for a precise definition and
elaboration on why the Ei⊂Ai feature is important to the theory.
13To see this, note that following choice renegotiate choice deliver gives both P and C
higher material payoff than choice reject.
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unkind response to a co-player believed to be unkind. However, in our game
such a use can be ruled out, because if C believes that P is unkind, then it
must be better for P to choose not (to deliver) than to reject; the former
choice brings a higher payoff to C as well as a lower payoff to P than the
latter choice does. This implies that ρ = 0.
Lemma 2 : In any SRE, δ ≥ ε. Assume to the contrary that δ < ε. P ’s
kindness depends on his choices and on bPC which specifies his beliefs about
δ, ε, and ρ. In an SRE these beliefs are correct and it follows that P must
be less kind following counter than following accept. To see this, refer to the
definition of κij (·) above (letting i = P ; j = C) and note that since ρ = 0
(Lemma 1), p > pr, and δ < ε we get
πC(counter , bPC) = ε · (pr − t) + (1− ε− ρ) · pr + ρ · 0 = pr − ε · t
<
πC(accept , bPC) = δ · (p− t) + (1− δ) · p = p− δ · t.
Moreover, since in SRE C’s beliefs about P ’s beliefs are correct, C similarly
perceives that P is more kind following accept than following counter. Now
note that the “marginal material impact” of C’s choices, on himself as well
as on P , is the same following accept as following counter. Namely, he
can incur-or-not “t” for himself, and he can give or deny “1” to P ). If
1 > ε > δ ≥ 0 then C must be indifferent between deliver and not following
counter (otherwise C wouldn’t be willing to mix), but based on what we just
said about the marginal material impact, it then follows that he must strictly
prefer deliver to not following accept. Hence, δ = 1, a contradiction. And if
1 = ε > δ ≥ 0, then C must (weakly) prefer deliver to not following counter,
but then again (based on what we said about the marginal material impact)
it follows that he must strictly prefer deliver to not following accept. Hence,
δ = 1, again a contradiction. We conclude that δ ≥ ε.
Lemma 3 : In any SRE, if 0 < ε < 1 then δ > ε. We verify this by
contradiction. If the implication were false then either 1 > ε = δ > 0 or
1 > ε > δ ≥ 0 would hold. Both of these cases can be considered simultane-
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ously. Applying analogous arguments as in Lemma 2, we can conclude that
πC(accept , bPC) > πC( counter , bPC) and that the marginal material impact
of C’s decision is the same following accept as following counter. Therefore,
C must be indifferent between deliver and not in the subgame following
counter, implying that δ = 1 which is a contradiction.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 is established by combining Lemmas 1 and 2.
It remains to prove part (ii) of Proposition 1. It is helpful to first establish
necessary conditions on YC for the existence of SRE with, respectively, δ =
ε = 0 and δ = ε = 1. For the former case, due to Lemma 2, we only need
to check that δ = 0 maximizes utility for C following accept. Plug relevant
numbers into the utility expression πC(·) + YC × κCP (·)× λCPC(·); one sees





depending on C’s choice,14 while λCPC(·) equals
p− 1
2
· (p+ 0) = p
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, so the following inequality holds:


















The inequality can be re-written as YC ≤ 2t.
For the latter case (δ = ε = 1), due to Lemma 2, we only need to check











, so the following inequality holds:




















≤ 0, then P ’s counteroffer is not interpreted as kind, and hence
the inequality will not hold for any YC . If
2pr−p−t
2
> 0, then we can re-write
the inequality as YC ≥
2t
2pr−p−t
. Note that 2t
2pr−p−t
> 2t.
Now select ℓ and h, with ℓ < h, such that neither of the necessary con-
ditions for SRE with δ = ε = 0 or δ = ε = 1 hold: If 2pr−p−t
2
≤ 0, select
14For not we get κCP = 0−π
e
C















(any) ℓ > 2t and then h > ℓ. If 2pr−p−t
2
> 0, select ℓ ∈ (2t, 2t
2pr−p−t
) and then
h ∈ (ℓ, 2t
2pr−p−t
). Suppose that YC ∈ (ℓ, h). Some SRE must exist; this follows
from D&K’s existence theorem. By design of ℓ and h, neither δ = ε = 0 or
δ = ε = 1 is compatible with SRE. Lemma 2 imposes the constraint that
δ ≥ ε. We can group the remaining possibilities into three cases: ε = 0 < δ
and 0 < ε ≤ δ < 1 and ε < δ = 1. For the first and last case, obviously ε < δ.
For the middle case, ε < δ is implied by Lemma 3. Part (ii) of Proposition
1 follows. 
A.2 Figures
Figure 1 displays CDFs of the final prices by treatment that were accepted
by the drivers.
Figure 1: Distributions of initial offers and final prices
Figure 2 shows the delivery rate (panel a) and other breaches of the
implicit agreement (panel b) between the RA-A and the cab driver.
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Figure 2: Cab drivers’ behavior
A.3 Two routes
Our main route follows Via Insurgentes, a major traffic artery in Mexico
City. Via Insurgentes runs through some of the most affluent neighborhoods
of the city.
Figure 3: Insurgentes route Figure 4: Downtown route
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A.4 A survey
Would our findings be surprising also to MC locals? In a separate laboratory
session conducted at ITAM, we invited 37 students, many of whom were MC
residents, to shed light on that question. We asked these subjects to guess
the outcome of the behavior in seven different scenarios involving plausible
trust situations around MC; the fourth one was designed to be reminiscent
of our experiment with the cab drivers:
1. You take a bus that is fully crammed with people. You manage to jump on
in the back door. The only way for you to pay the fare is to send the money
up front to the driver by asking passengers to pass it on up front. The bus
fare is 5 pesos but you do not have any change so your only option is to pass
20 pesos. Will you get the change back?
2. You are at a street market (mercado sobre ruedas) looking for a gift for
your friend. You come across a seller who is selling artisan tiles with custom
writings on them. You would like to have one of those made with your
friend’s name on it. The seller wants the full payment of 100 pesos up front
and promises to bring you the tile (same place same time) one week later. If
you decide to go ahead and pay him, will you get your tile one week later?
3. You are at a football match and have to use a restroom. There is no assigned
seating and you happen to have a good seat. If you leave your jacket on
your seat as a place holder will it still be there after you’ve come back?
4. You need to pass a school project to your friend which is due the next day.
The project contains sounds and video clips so you burn it on a CD. You
cannot leave the house because you have to watch after your little brother.
If you flag a cab on the street and pay the amount he asks ahead of time
will the CD get to your friend?
5. You are in a bar around Centro Historico with a group of five friends cel-
ebrating your birthday. You feel generous and offer to pick up the tab for
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the night. If you give the credit card to the bartender will the final tab at
the end of the night be correct?
6. You go to the stadium to buy tickets for a football match that will take place
tomorrow but they are sold out. A man outside the ticket office (a scalpel)
offers to get you tickets at 30% discount. He does not have the tickets on
him but has to walk over to his friend to get them. If you give him the
money will he show up with the tickets?
7. You are going to a birthday party in La Condesa but can’t find a spot to
park your car. You have just come from a long road-trip and your car is full
of personal belongings bags etc. in the back and front seat. If you leave the
car at a Valet Parking will everything be there when you pick it up?
Responses were incentivized using the Houser & Xiao payment procedure
according to which subjects get paid if their answers match the answer of
another randomly selected participant in the room. This effectively creates
a coordination game among the subjects. Our thinking was that if a subject
thought it obvious that the correct answer would be yes, then they would
attempt to coordinate on the corresponding equilibrium in the procedure.
Overall, such coordination did not happen. In the fourth scenario, 43% of
subjects guessed that the cab would not deliver; the rest guessed that the
cab would deliver. Among those born in MC, 52% thought the cab would
not deliver. This suggests that it is not common knowledge among MC locals
that the correct answer should be yes.
A comparison across all seven scenarios provides some additional insights.
We have listed them above according to how likely we found it (based on our
intuition) to get a positive response, with scenario 1 appearing most likely
to us. In the experiment, we scrambled the presentation order, and to allow
some robustness check we ran two different orderings: Ord-#1 and Ord-#2.
In Ord-#1 our cab scenario was listed second in the sequence and in Ord-
#2 it was listed sixth. Ord-#1 was run with 18 subjects and Ord-#2 with
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Table 1: Frequency of trusting responses
Scenarios
1 2 3 4 5 6 7*
All data:
Ord 1 (18) 13 13 6 4 1 10 10
Ord 2 (19) 17 12 8 8 2 10 11
Total 30 25 14 12 3 20 21
Total % 81 68 38 32 8 54 57
Mex. City natives:
Ord 1 (14) 10 10 5 3 1 7 6
Ord 2 (13) 11 10 6 7 2 5 7
Total 21 20 11 10 3 12 13
Total % 78 74 41 37 11 44 48
Note: * denotes our cab scenario. In Ord 1 the cab scenario
was 2nd in the sequence; in Ord 2 it was 6th. The number
of observations for each ordering is in the parentheses.
19. The frequencies of trusting responses for all scenarios, orderings, and
for full vs. restricted-to-MC-subjects sample are reported in Table 1. The
frequencies of positive responses roughly align with our intuitions, with the
cabs scenario taking a middling position.15
15Also: the responses are slightly more trusting in Ord #2 than Ord #1 and the observed
patterns seem roughly consistent between the full and the restricted sample.
15
References
[1] Balafoutas L, Beck A, Kerchsbamer R, Sutter M (2013), “What drives
taxi drivers? A field experiment on fraud in a market for credence
goods,” Review of Economic Studies 80, 876-891.
[2] Balafoutas L, Kerchsbamer R, Sutter M (2017), “Second-degree moral
hazard in a real-world credence goods market,” Economic Journal 127,
1-18.
[3] Bengtsson N, (2016), “Efficient informal trade: Theory and evidence
from the Cape Town taxi market,” Journal of Development Economics
115, 85-98.
[4] Berg J, Dickhaut J, McCabe K (1995), “Trust, reciprocity, and social
history,” Games & Economic Behavior 10, 122-142.
[5] Castillo M, Petrie R, Torero M, Vesterlund L (2013), “Gender differences
in bargaining outcomes: A field experiment on discrimination,” Journal
of Public Economics 99, 35-482.
[6] Charness G, Dufwenberg M, (2006), “Promises and partnership,” Econo-
metrica 117, 817-869.
[7] Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G (2004), “A theory of sequential reci-
procity,” Games & Economic Behavior 47, 268-98.
[8] Dufwenberg M, Servátka M, Vadovic̆ R (2017), “Honesty and informal
agreements,” Games & Economic Behavior 102, 269-285.
[9] Fehr E, Gaechter S (2000), “Fairness and retaliation: The economics of
reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 159-181.
[10] Houser D, Xiao E (2011), “Classification of natural language messages
using a coordination game,” Experimental Economics 14, 1-14.
16
[11] Miettinen, T (2013), “Promises and conventions – an approach to pre-
play agreements,” Games and Economic Behavior 80, 68-84.
[12] Rabin, M (1993), “Incorporating fairness into game theory and eco-
nomics,” American Economic Review 83, 1281-1302.
[13] Sobel, J (2005), “Interdependent preferences and reciprocity,” Journal
of Economic Literature 43, 396-440.
[14] Vanberg C (2008), “Why do people keep their promises? An experimen-
tal test of two explanations,” Econometrica 76, 1467-1480.
17
